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LIABILITY ISSUES WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
SOFTWARE
I. INTRODUCTION
"Computers can only issue mandatory instructions-they are
not programmed to exercise discretion.'
It has been fifteen years since this statement was made by a
New York court,2 and it is no longer strictly true. What only decades
ago was the stuff of science fiction is today the reality of science:
computers capable of solving problems by replicating human thought
processes.' Through the use of artificial intelligence (hereinafter
AI),' programs are available that provide tax advice,' diagnose medi-
cal conditions," and configure computers." With continued research,
the scope of Al programs will broaden,8 and as it penetrates markets
for critical services and processes it is likely the potential for catas-
trophe will increase.' When one considers that conventional software
1. Pompeii Estates, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 397 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1977).
2. Id.
3. Cariad Hayes, Artificial Intelligence: The Future's Getting Closer, AM. LAW., Nov.
1988, at 115. Hayes points out that certain "software programs ...in their complexity ...
imitate certain processes of the human brain." Id.
4. Artificial intelligence is a general term used to describe that aspect of computer sci-
ence "concerned with understanding the nature of intelligent action and constructing computer
systems capable of such action." Allen Newell, Artificial Intelligence, in 2 McGRAw-HI.t.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOcY 120 (Sybil P. Parker ed., 7th ed. 1992). "A
machine has artificial intelligence when there is no discernible difference between the conversa-
tion generated by the machine and that of an intelligent person." ALAN FREEDMAN, THE
COMPUTER GLOSSARY: THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED DESK REFERENCE 12 (5th ed. 1991)
(quoting Alan Turing).
5. "AskDan," a program from Legal Knowledge Systems Inc., does tax calculations and
identifies tax loopholes. Lance B. Eliot, Mass Market Applications: They're Here, Al EXPERT,
Dec. 1989, at 9.
6. MYCIN, developed at Stanford University, is used by physicians to diagnose bacte-
rial blood infections. Yi-Tzuu Chien & Jay Liebowitz, Artificial Intelligence, in 2 EN:YCLO-
PEDIA OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 14 (Robert A. Meyers ed., 1987). Family-
Care Software from Lundin Laboratories, Inc. gives pediatric advice. Eliot, supra note 5, at 9.
7. XCON was developed by Carnegie-Mellon University for use in configuring Digital
Equipment Corporation's VAX computers. Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 15.
8. Laurence H. Reece III, Defective Expert Systems Raise Personal Injury Liability
Issues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 24.
9. It has been reported that a patient died from excess radiation when a computer-
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programs have resulted in near misses between commercial jets, the
closing of nuclear power plants, and a missile alert triggered by a
false indication of a world war,1" it is easy to predict additional
problems could be wrought by a program mimicking human
thought. Furthermore, as systems become more complex, malfunc-
tion is inevitable." When such failure occurs, who bears the liabil-
ity? The answer is unclear.
The impact of an AI program error has not yet been considered
by the courts and no case law exists providing guidance to the
software developer, vendor, or user with respect to the potential lia-
bility of each. In addition, there are no statutes dealing with this
issue. This comment proposes a standard for liability that eliminates
this uncertainty.
This comment first discusses the differences between conven-
tional and AI software, 2 including the special subset of AI known as
expert systems," then presents various theories of liability and how
they relate to Al. 4 Finally, a proposal that a strict liability standard
be applied to AI will be presented. 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Software: Conventional and Artificial Intelligence Systems
Software is the set of instructions specifying the required steps
for data processing by a computer. The term generally includes the
system software (i.e. the operating system), application software, and
controlled radiation-therapy machine malfunctioned. In another incident, payment was stopped
on checks which, due to a software error, paid bondholders $4 million in excess interest. In
another instance, twenty sailors were killed due to a problem with a computer-controlled air-
defense missile system that malfunctioned as a result of an error. Bob Davis, Costly Bugs,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1987, at Al; L. Nancy Birnbaum, Strict Products Liability and Com-
puter Software, 8 COMPUTER/L.J. 135, 144 n.64 (1988). See also Bev Litulewood & Lorenzo
Strigini, The Risks of Software, Sci. AM., Nov. 1992, at 62, 62-63.
10. Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COM-
PuTERS, TECH. & L. 173 (1981).
11. "No complex computer program has ever been marketed that did not have some
defect, somewhere." Hayes, supra note 3, at 115 (quoting Robert Cesari). But see Littlewood
& Strigini, supra note 9, at 62 (stating that, in theory, design faults in a program could be
detected and removed).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 16-75.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 35-62.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 76-153.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
16. JOHN T. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 1.06, at 8 (1983).
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documentation.17 Application software is also referred to as a pro-
gram, "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indi-
rectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."18
1. Conventional Software
Conventional programs operate in a linear fashion, manipulat-
ing input provided by the user through a specific process to reach a
designated output. 9 The process is based on a specific algorithm20
that produces generally consistent results for. given input, with little
if any interaction between the user and the program.21 Such pro-
grams provide the basis for familiar computer-based activities in
which sequential procedures clearly define actions to solve a prob-
lem: Handling large quantities of numbers and symbols for spread-
sheets, databases, word-processing, and financial analysis.2" The pro-
grams are generally designed to be mass-marketed rather than
custom-designed.23 There is little, if any, interaction between the
end-user of the software and the developer, and the skill of the indi-
vidual user or specific intended use for the program is not considered
prior to sale by the vendor. ' Despite extensive testing, it is unlikely
any conventional program is error-free. 25 Errors or "bugs ' 26 can be
introduced at a number of points during the development, loading, or
operation of the program.27 The question is not whether there is
some risk, but rather what risk level is acceptable to maximize use-
fulness and minimize liability.28
17. Id.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
19. G. Steven Tuthill, Legal Liabilities and Expert Systems, AI EXPERT, Mar. 1991, at
44, 48.
20. An algorithm is "a well-defined procedure for solving a problem or doing some
task." MICHAEL. C. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAW app. at 655 (1985).
21. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
22. Id.
23. SOMA, supra note 11, § 3.12, at 89-91.
24. Mass-marketed programs are available indiscriminately on payment of a fee through
a variety of channels: Mail-order, retail, or wholesale outlets. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE
LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY T 5.16, at 5-59 (1985).
25. "It has frequently been said that the only error-free program is the one that will
never be run again." Gemignani, supra note 10, at 185 (quoting A. Pietrasanta, quoted in
PROGRAM TEST METHODS 1 (W. Hetzel ed. 1973)); see also Hayes, supra note 3, at 115.
26. A bug is "an error in a program." GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, app. at 657.
27. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 183-84.
28. Id. at 187.
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2. Artificial Intelligence/Expert Systems
Artificial intelligence programs utilize the knowledge of the re-
lationship between objects and events in a particular focused problem
area (the "domain") 29 as the basis for problem solving." Rather
than using a mathematical algorithm to manipulate data, Al depends
on the "symbolic manipulation of information" through the use of
heuristics. 1 Unlike mathematical algorithms, heuristics do not al-
ways "work" to give a precise answer; they merely offer a "clue" to
the solution. 2 It is by combining all useful ideas or clues and having
adequate knowledge about the problem domain that the solution is
obtained. 3 Therefore, sufficient knowledge, provided by human ex-
perts, is required. 4
A specific subset of Al is an expert system,35 a computer pro-
gram that "emulates the behavior of human experts within a specific
domain of knowledge."3" Unlike human experts, expert systems are
"permanent, easy to transfer, easy to document, consistent and af-
fordable."3 7 Shortcomings of such programs are that "[t]hey are less
creative and less adaptive"38 than people and are incapable of apply-
ing common-sense knowledge to a problem. 9 Because even an expert
is not always 100% accurate, the expert system is designed to accom-
modate uncertainty or incomplete information.40 Therefore, unlike
conventional software, expert systems are more tolerant of errors and
imperfect knowledge. 4' They are "journey-oriented": Using heuristic
knowledge-based rules and user input, the expert system operates in
a nonlinear way to reach a solution.42 The user, by choosing inputs
that trigger various branches in the program, acts interactively with
29. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
30. Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 2.
31. Id. at 3. Heuristics are strategies that are used to guide a search process to a solu-
tion. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. In this comment, the terms artificial intelligence and expert systems are used inter-
changeably because the legal issues associated with each of them apply to the other.
36. Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 10. Expert systems are also known as knowl-
edge-based expert systems and expert problem-solvers. Id. Other subsets of Al include knowl-
edge-based systems, intelligent tutoring systems, intelligent databases, and intelligent job aids.
Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
37. Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 15.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
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the expert system."3 Thus two different users, operating from the
same fact base, might select different alternatives and generate differ-
ent results.
Designing a functional expert system requires the interaction of
a number of people: Domain (human) experts, knowledge engineers,
programmers, program designers and developers."" A critical part of
an expert system is the knowledge base,45 that section of the program
containing the facts and rules provided by a human expert. 6 An
expert system "is only as good as its knowledge base.' 7 The quality
of the knowledge base depends on the expertise of both the domain
expert and the knowledge engineer."' The domain expert provides
the facts and determines the reasoning process, and the knowledge
engineer, although not an expert in the particular subject area,
builds an expert system by converting the knowledge into rules suita-
ble for use in the system.' 9 Once the rules are specified, program-
mers50 write the actual code for the system.51 Thus the development
of the program is interactive, relying on a number of people of dif-
fering skills to produce something to be sold by a vendor.
Expert systems were traditionally custom-designed by universi-
ties and research companies for such activities as medical diagnosis,
data and electrical analysis, automatic programming, and planning.52
43. Id.
44. Id. at 46-48; Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
45. An expert system consists of a dialog structure to provide a language interface for
interaction of the user with the program, an inference engine allowing generation of a hypoth-
esis to solve the problem, and a knowledge base consisting of facts and rules provided by a
human expert. Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 11-12. Successful expert systems have
been created when (1) there was at least one expert in the problem domain, (2) the expertise
was based on judgment and experience, (3) the expertise was communicated to a knowledge
engineer, (4) the problem was defined, (5) there was a consensus in the problem domain, and
(6) test data were available. Id. at 10.
46. Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
47. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
48. Id.; Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
49. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48; Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
50. Reece, supra note 8, at 24. Designers specify the concept of the entire system; devel-
opers identify user needs, target markets, and specify the audience for the program. Tuthill,
supra note 19, at 46.
51. "Code" is the generic term for both the languages and symbols used in computer
programs. GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, app. at 658. Two types of instructions are generally
thought to comprise code. Machine language, the instructions that can be directly executed by
the central processing unit, is not readily understood by even skilled computer experts. Id. at
662. Source code is the high level language form of the program. Id. at 665. When assembled,
a source code becomes an object code. See id. at 663. Source code is generally a human-reada-
ble form of code. Roland B. Desilets, Jr., Note, Software Vendors' Exposure to Products
Liability for Computer Viruses, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 509, 524 (1989).
52. Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 16-18.
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As the systems have developed, however, they have fallen into three
distinct categories: Those sold in a mass-marketing mode5" as a
ready-to-use program (i.e. a "turnkey" system); those custom-made
for a particular application; and those modified for a particular
user's needs.54 The interaction between the expert system developers
and the end-user is minimal for the first category, maximum for the
second category, and at a moderate level for the third category.5 5 For
custom systems, the user may be the domain expert, and possibly
even the knowledge engineer.56 As such, the user is responsible for
creating and loading the knowledge base. 7 This action blurs the dis-
tinction between the software developer and the end-user.
Mass-marketed expert systems can be categorized in a number
of ways depending on their design and intended use. Some systems
are sold as "products" for use any time by the buyer; others are
provided as "services" for temporary use to a user who pays a fee.5"
In this latter case, the program stays under the management of the
creator or vendor. 9 Additionally, the program may be either free-
standing or embedded.6" If freestanding, the expert system consti-
tutes the nucleus of the application; little other software is needed for
operation of the program. 61 If embedded, the expert system com-
prises only a part of the entire program and serves to act only when
invoked for a specific purpose.62
3. Sources of Program Error
Computer systems are complex and provide fertile ground for
error. In addition to problems arising from incorrect data entry,
hardware failure or electrical noise,6" errors or "bugs" can develop
53. Mass-market expert systems are defined as those applications that "generally run on
microcomputers, cost less than $500, and have a limited range of expert performance." Eliot,
supra note 5, at 9.
54. Reece, supra note 8, at 28.
55. The turnkey system has properties most like a product, the custom system most
resembles a service, and the modified system is a hybrid of a product and a service. Id. at 28;
see infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
56. Hayes, supra note 3, at 115.
57. Id.
58. Eliot, supra note 5, at 10. The distinction here between a "product" and a "service"
may not be the same as that made when considering the applicability of U.C.C. Article 2. See
infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
59. Eliot, supra note 5, at 10.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Michael C. Gemignani, More on the Use of Computers by Professionals, 13
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from mistakes made by the programmer while preparing the code or
flaws that occur during duplication of the disks that carry the code. 6 '
These types of errors are common to both conventional software and
AL.65 Expert systems, however, are subject to other errors, ranging
from the unsuitability of the use of AI for a particular problem due
to complexity or the need for common sense, to the lack of adequate
expert knowledge or the failure of the human expert to supply accu-
rate and complete facts and rules."' Additional problems can arise
when the user implements the system: A poor choice of program,
unrealistic reliance on the output, or faulty input.6" Furthermore, if
the system is not maintained and updated, the knowledge base may
become obsolete, thus producing outdated output.66
With conventional software, the source of most errors can gen-
erally be determined because the error is reproducible.69 Other er-
rors resulting from transient conditions70 may prove difficult to de-
tect and understand. With expert systems, however, because of the
interactive nature of the program with the user and the nonlinear
approach to output,7 1 it may not be possible to precisely determine
how an error occurs.
4. Summary
Despite the fact that both conventional software and Al
software can be encoded in computer language and run on conven-
tional computing equipment, there are significant differences.7 , Al
and expert systems manipulate knowledge; conventional software
manipulates data.7 ' The systems therefore vary in their development
strategy, problem-solving methods, and level of user interaction .7
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317, 323 (1987).
64. Reece, supra note 8, at 25.
65. Id.
66. Id. One author has divided expert system errors into two categories: Those resulting
from poor design (e.g. unrealistic concept, insufficient or out-of-date knowledge base, incor-
rectly identified user group, and poor documentation) and those resulting from poor execution
(e.g. bugs in the inference engine, incorrect links or branches in the program, inaccurate heu-
ristic knowledge, and user input errors). Tuthill, supra note 19, at 46-47, 51.
67. Reece, supra note 8, at 25.
68. Id. at 25-26; Tuthill, supra note 19, at 47.
69. Gemignani, supra note 63, at 323 n.31.
70. Transient conditions include power surges and incipient defects in the equipment.
Id.
71. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
74. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
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Unlike conventional software, in which output from given data is
reproducible, with expert systems, the combination of a large num-
ber of program branches and a nonlinear approach means the user
can influence the output."
B. Liability Standards
One commentator stated, "[n]o complex computer program has
ever been marketed that did not have some defect, somewhere.""8
Developers and vendors of artificial intelligence systems, which may
be the most complex programs of all, must be concerned with poten-
tial liabilities." Liability may arise under three scenarios: When re-
mote parties such as a manufacturer and a consumer are connected
by virtue of the sale of a product; when two parties are in a direct
contractual relationship; and when the user relies on information
supplied by the computer system.7 8
The first scenario considers negligence and strict liability under
tort law. Breach of warranties, both express and implied, falls within
both the first and the second scenarios. The third scenario again
deals with negligence.
1. Negligence
Liability for negligence occurs in two situations with respect to
computer programs: When the software is defective and when a
party is injured as a result of using the software."9 Both situations
raise issues for AI programs. Negligence is the failure to use the care
a reasonably prudent person would use under similar circum-
stances.80 To prevail on a negligence claim a plaintiff must show the
defendant had a duty of care, breached that duty, and caused an
injury to the plaintiff as a result of that breach.8' While there is
little question a software vendor owes a duty of care to a consumer,
the more difficult issue is what standard of care is owed.82 It is well
established that a seller of goods83 has a duty to exercise the care of a
75. Id.
76. Hayes, supra note 3, at 115 (quoting Robert Cesari).
77. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 49-51.
78. NIMMER, supra note 24, 7.01, at 7-2.
79. See Tuthill, supra note 19, at 49.
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
81. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
82. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 189.
83. See discussion of whether Al and expert systems constitute "goods" infra notes 110-
[Vol. 33
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LIABILITY
reasonable person to see that the goods sold do not harm the buyer."'
Instead of this general standard, it has been proposed that the correct
standard of care for the software vendor, and particularly for those
creating the software, is that of a professional. 85 A professional is
one who possesses a standard minimum of special knowledge and
ability, and who undertakes work requiring special skill.8" A profes-
sional is held to a higher standard than a non-professional, and the
performance of a professional is measured against an ordinary mem-
ber of the profession who has the same level of knowledge, training,
and skill.8 7 Thus computer professionals (assuming the "profes-
sional" designation is appropriate) would be comparable to other
professionals such as doctors, engineers, and lawyers whose profes-
sional breach is called malpractice.88 Courts have been unwilling to
apply such a standard, 9 perhaps because of the lack of a licensing
procedure for programmers (that would establish a gauge of mini-
mum ability), 90 or because of the fact that programming is only a
small part of the total process of software development.91 The prob-
lem of establishing a standard of care for AI is complicated by the
16 and accompanying text.
84. KEETON ET At.., supra note 81, § 96, at 684. Manifestations of a seller's lack of
care include misrepresentation of the type of goods or their fitness for a particular purpose,
failure to disclose potential danger if the good is used for the buyer's purpose, sale to an
obviously incompetent buyer, and failure to exercise reasonable care to inspect the goods. Id.
85. Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 1, 9 (1979).
86. KEETON ET Al.., supra note 81, § 32, at 185.
87. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 50.
88. KEETON ET AL.., supra note 81, § 32, at 185-88.
89. Chatlos Systems Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
1979) (declining to create a cause of action for computer malpractice under state law), rev'd
on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), affd after remand, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
604 F.2d 737, 741, 744-45 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting cause of action for computer malpractice
because a professional relationship did not exist when plaintiff attempted to avoid a statute of
limitations problem by arguing that the "continuous treatment" doctrine used in medical mal-
practice should extend to negligent repairs); Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 612 F. Supp. 448
(N.D. Ohio 1984). In Invacare, after holding that the computer malpractice claim was non-
actionable, the court held that computer professionals were subject to the same negligence
standard as machinists, electricians, carpenters, blacksmiths, and plumbers. Id. at 453. The
court did not consider whether computer malpractice involved a higher standard of care. Id. at
454. But see Data Processing'Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that a contract to provide computer programming was a service contract
and that programmer breached implied promise of having reasonable skill and diligence pos-
sessed by well-informed members of the trade). See generally Sue G. Graziano, Computer
Malpractice-A New Tort on the Horizon?, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & T:c.. L.J. 177
(1991).
90. Nycum, supra note 85, at 9-10.
91. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 190.
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fact that different standards may be appropriate for the different
people involved in developing the system" and it might be very diffi-
cult to detect which of them created the fault. Certainly for the
human expert, specifically selected due to the high level of skill and
expertise possessed, a high level of care is expected, especially given
the potential for catastrophe with a defective program.9" The hybrid
role of the knowledge engineer, who acts as a bridge between the
human expert and the programmer, suggests that a professional
standard should be applied because it is the expertise that is critical
to the success of the program.94 Other members of the development
team, such as a quality assurance technician, might be held to a
lower standard.
A breach of the duty of care may occur in a number of ways. If
the software is defective due to errors and malfunctions that could
have been detected by the vendor and/or creator, the key issue is
how much testing is enough.95 For Al systems this is an especially
difficult problem because not all permutations and branches of a pro-
gram can ever be tested, particularly if the user has the freedom to
make choices during the normal operation of the program. However,
as discussed above,96 if an expert system is inadequate for a particu-
lar problem because common sense is needed for a solution, if the
knowledge base is incomplete or inadequate, or if the problem is too
complex, the development, marketing, and use of the system could be
negligent. 97 Errors may be generated by the vendor due to incorrect
information supplied by the human expert, poor design, manufactur-
ing, testing, and distribution, inaccurate or inadequate warnings and
documentation, or failure to maintain and update the knowledge
base.9" The user also may act negligently by providing faulty input
or selecting the incorrect program for the task.99 Furthermore, if the
user unduly relies on the output and does not exercise sufficient
92. Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
93. Id. at 25.
[Olne of the most alarming features of expert systems is that they can dramati-
cally multiply the potential for harm that can be caused by a single human
expert because any errors or omissions by the expert will become an integral
part of the system to be applied by hundreds or even thousands of users.
Id.
94. See id. at 25.
95. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 191.
96. See generally supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
97. See Reece, supra note 8, at 25; Tuthill, supra note 19, at 51.
98. Reece, supra note 8, at 25, 28.
99. Id. at 25.
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judgment in evaluating the answers, the user may be negligent.1 "
The causation element also must be considered. To prevail on a
negligence claim, the plaintiff must show there is "some reasonable
connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the
damage which the plaintiff has suffered." ' Due to the number of
potentially negligent parties and the complexity of the program,
proving that the program actually caused the injury may be espe-
cially difficult.'0 2 Furthermore, the vendor or creator of the software
may assert a defense to negligence.' The user may be held to have
assumed the risk,'0 4 or at least contributed to the negligence'0 5 in one
of two ways: First, by failing to maintain a level of skill necessary
for reasonably prudent use of the program;'00 and second, by mis-
placing confidence in the infallibility of the program with the conse-
quence that the results are not carefully reviewed and tested by the
user. 107
2. Strict Liability
Strict liability' does not require the plaintiff prove the defend-
100. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 47, 50.
101. KEErON ETr AL., supra note 81, § 41, at 263. Causation includes cause in fact and
proximate cause (legal cause). Id. "[C]ausation in fact extends not only to positive acts and
active physical forces, but also to pre-existing passive conditions which have played a material
part in bringing about the event." Id. § 41, at 265.
102. See id. § 41, at 265.
103. Defenses to negligence include contributory negligence, comparative negligence,
and assumption of risk. Id. §§ 65-68, at 451-80.
104. Assumption of risk includes situations where the plaintiff consents in advance to
relieving the defendant of an obligation and agrees to risk injury resulting from the defendant's
act or omission; where the plaintiff voluntarily tacitly consents to the negligence with the
knowledge defendant will provide protection; and where the plaintiff voluntarily proceeds to
act after being informed of the risk. Id. § 68, at 480-90.
105. Contributory negligence is conduct by the plaintiff that results in harm to the
plaintiff and is below the standard required for the plaintiff's own protection. Id. § 65, at 451.
106. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 50.
107. Roy N. Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, 6 PRAC. LAW. 15,
40 (Nov. 1960), reprinted in COMPUTERS AND LAW: A REFERENCE WORK 2, 14 (Roy N.
Freed ed., 5th ed. 1976).
108. Strict liability is a theory applied "in product liability cases in which seller is liable
for any and all defective or hazardous products which unduly threaten a consumer's personal
safety." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990). No privity of contract is required
between the seller and a third party who is injured. KEETON ET At.., supra note 81, § 100, at
703-04. The theory is stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1964):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
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ant was negligent or at fault, but rather the product was defective
and unreasonably dangerous when used in a normal, intended, or
reasonably foreseeable manner, and that the defect caused plaintiff's
injury.1 ° Because strict liability applies to "any product,"' 110 the first
issue in applying strict liability to software is determining whether
the software is classified as a product (in which case strict liability
may apply) or a service (in which case strict liability does not ap-
ply). 1 While the extremes are easily classified, 12 many expert sys-
tems are so complex in design and function as to be hybrids. 1 3 It has
been proposed that the program be classified by analyzing its func-
tion and its end product. 1 Thus, if the expert system is used to
provide a service that a human might perform, e.g. investment coun-
seling, the program might be designated a service.11 Conversely, if
the system merely provides routine data analysis, the program might
be designated a product. This "function" approach suffers from the
fact that many expert systems designed to provide such "services"
are themselves mass-marketed in the way that "goods" routinely are
sold. "' In addition, analysis of function and end product includes
subjective evaluation, producing inconsistent results in classification.
The second issue in determining whether strict liability applies
is determining whether the software was defective and thus unrea-
sonably unsafe. 7 A product is considered defective when it is cor-
rectly made according to an unreasonably dangerous design (i.e. a
design defect), 8 when there is incorrect implementation of a safe
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
109. RESIATEMENT (SE:COND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1964).
110. Id.
111. Tod M. Turley, Note, Expert Software Systems: The Legal Implications, 8 CoM-
Pu'rER/L.J. 455, 457 (1988).
112. Mass-produced, mass-marketed programs, both conventional and expert systems,
are likely to be classified as a good or a product and thus be subject to strict liability; custom-
generated software with unique features is likely to be classified as a service and thus be
subject to a negligence standard. Id.
113. Reece, supra note 8, at 28.
114. Turley, supra note 111, at 457-58.
115. Id. at 458 n.16.
116. See Eliot, supra note 5, at 9.
117. R.STA'EMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1964).
118. KEETON ET AL.., supra note 81, § 99, at 695.
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design (i.e. a manufacturing defect),' 19 or when there are inadequate
warnings and instructions concerning the potential dangers of use.' 20
Of particular concern are unavoidably dangerous products that can-
not be made safe given the present state of human skill and knowl-
edge. 21 For complex expert system software that probably cannot be
fully tested, 2 ' this latter concern is important.
Two additional factors associated with strict liability must be
considered. First, in order for conventional strict liability to apply, a
physical harm, i.e. personal injury or property damage, must result
from use of the product. 2 ' Therefore, strictly economic loss is gener-
ally insufficient to establish liability.1 24 If defective software causes
customer loss or poor business decisions, strict liability does not ap-
ply.'25 Second, unlike contract warranties,' 26 strict liability cannot be
disclaimed.' 27 In addition, warnings may not be deemed sufficient as
protection against strict liability, especially if they are buried in a
lengthy users' manual.'
21
Applying strict liability to expert system software is particularly
relevant for two reasons.' 29 First, the definition of product has been
broadened beyond tangible property,"' thus increasing the possibil-
ity it applies to software. Secondly, applying strict liability serves
public policy considerations such as risk-spreading.' 3  Strict liability,
119. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 138-39.
120. KEETON ET AL.., supra note 81, § 99, at 695.
121. Id. at 700-01.
122. See Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
123. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 140; see also KEETON ET AL.., supra note 81, § 101, at
708.
124. See KEETON ET At.., supra note 81, § 101, at 708.
125. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 140.
126. See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
127. GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, § 29:2, at 413.
128. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 139.
129. Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
130. See Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 647-48 (Wis. 1979)
(holding that electricity is a consumable product and thus strict liability applies). A conven-
tional definition of product is "[g]oods produced or manufactured, either by natural means, by
hand, or with tools, machinery, chemicals, or the like." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (6th
ed. 1990).
131. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 196-97. Among the reasons suggested for application
of strict liability, four are generally recognized. First, responsibility for damages due to defec-
tive goods should be borne by the party in the best position to detect and eliminate the defects.
Second, the party best able to absorb and spread the risk through insurance should bear the
liability. Third, the injured party should not have to meet burdensome proof requirements in
order to obtain relief. Fourth, the doctrine of caveat emptor is of little importantance in view
of modern marketing methods. David A. Hall, Note, Strict Products Liability and Computer
Software: Caveat Vendor, 4 COMPUTER/L.J. 373, 373 n.1 (1983); see also Susan Lanoue,
Comment, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439,
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however, has not been successfully applied by the courts for software
applications or for situations in which the project was considered a
professional service.132
3. Breach of Warranties
A third area of liability to consider is that of warranties: what
warranties, if any, are expressed or implied in the sale of
software?133 If software is defined as a good, then both the express
and implied warranties described in Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (hereinafter U.C.C.) apply." 4 Thus, prior to applying
the standards of the U.C.C., the distinction between products (goods)
and services, as discussed above, must be made. 3 Because a com-
puter program can be moved and conveyed to another at the time of
sale, it is arguably a good.' 36 However, if the program, like many
expert systems, is a hybrid, such a designation may not be strictly
accurate. 1 In at least one case," 8 a court used the "predominant
feature" test to balance the relative service and product aspects of a
contract for the purchase of software.' 39 In that case the court found
the vendor's contractual obligations to install the software, debug the
system, and provide training were services subservient to the sale of
the product, and contractual remedies were applied. 4
447-49 & n.12 (1983). The Lanoue comment describes the goals of strict liability as loss
spreading, accident reduction, victim compensation, and loss compensation. Id. These policies
were first discussed in Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-43 (Cal. 1944).
132. See Chatlos Systems Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740-
41 & n.1 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), affd after
remand, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); see also La
Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968) (finding that strict liability did not
apply to an engineering company that designed a plant containing a reactor incorporating
carcinogenic vanadium pellets because engineering was a professional service).
133. Desilets, supra note 51, at 513. This comment does not discuss the issue of
whether a software program is "licensed" rather than "sold."
134. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990). Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods." Id. Goods are
"all things (including specially manufactured goods) that are movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale." Id. § 2-105(1).
135. Desilets, supra note 51, at 513.
136. , Lanoue, supra note 131, at 443 n.12.
137. The service aspects, such as delivery, installation, and program start-up, which are
incidental to the sale of the software, are not considered sufficient to automatically characterize
the software as a service and thus remove it from the scope of the U.C.C. SOMA, supra note
16, § 3.07, at 78-79 & n.21.
138. RXX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
139. Id. at 546.
140. Id. The emphasis in this case was on breach of contract issues, and the issue of
strict liability was not raised. See also Turley, supra note 111, at 459.
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Express warranties fall under the provisions of U.C.C. section
2-313, which provide that any fact or promise by the vendor to the
customer relating to the goods sold creates an express warranty that
the goods shall meet the promised standard.141 Express warranties
include specific written promises made as part of the contract, as
well as oral representations made by a salesman, promotional
brochures, instruction booklets, and advertisements. 42 Because no
software vendor would presume to sell a defect-free program,143 it is
common for the warranty to be qualified by disclaimers, limitations,
and modifications.' 44 Such disclaimers are generally upheld if they
are not unconscionable under the particular circumstances,"" and if
the language of the disclaimer is consistent with the warranty. 46
Given that few unqualified express warranties are made by
vendors of software, the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness of use for a particular purpose should be considered.14 7 The
implied warranty of merchantability presented in U.C.C. section 2-
314 allows a purchaser to have confidence the vendor is selling goods
that are of ordinary quality in the trade and that conform to any
promises made on the label 1 48 The implied warranty of fitness for a
particular use under U.C.C. section 2-315 imposes an additional
duty on the vendor if it is known at the time of sale or contract what
specific purpose the buyer intends for the product, and if the buyer
has relied on the vendor's skill or judgment to sell the appropriate
product. 49 This warranty is critical for expert systems if the pro-
gram is sold with the idea-expressed or implied-that it will pro-
vide a "total solution" to the customer.1 "' Furthermore, the user may
not have adequate knowledge of computers and expert systems and
will rely heavily on the vendor's "expertise."'' These implied war-
ranties can be restricted by the use of disclaimers under the provi-
141. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990).
142. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 179 n.22.
143. Desilets, supra note 51, at 515.
144. NIMMER, supra note 24, $ 6.07[1], at 6-20. Nimmer notes that because the express
warranty is part of the basis of the bargain, in theory, it cannot be disclaimed. Pro forma
language disclaiming additional representations is insufficient. Id.
145. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 49.
146. NIMMER, supra note 24, $ 6.07[1], at 6-20.
147' Desilets, supra note 51, at 515.
148. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990).
149. Id. § 2-315.
150. Desilets, supra note 51, at 516. One writer pointed out "expert system technology
usually enhances a product's suability and differentiates it in the public's mind." Eliot, supra
note 5, at 9-10.
151. Desilets, supra note 51, at 515-16, 524.
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sions of U.C.C. section 2-316.152 If the disclaimers are part of a
fairly negotiated contract, meet U.C.C. guidelines, and are not
against public policy, they are generally upheld.'5 3 These issues are
important for expert systems that have been mass-marketed and for
which there is no individually negotiated sales contract.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Liability Options
The limited case law concerning software"' has focused on con-
ventional programs.' 55 Although a standard for liability is not estab-
lished, these cases are useful guides, and, when appropriate, can be
applied to Al software. However, the differences between expert sys-
tems and conventional software, as well as the differences between
mass-marketed and custom-designed software, mean a standard for
conventional software cannot be applied unilaterally. Thus, the ef-
fects of applying various liability standards to AI and expert system
software as compared to conventional software are considered.
1. Apply a Strict Liability Standard to All Software
From the perspective of the software consumer, strict liability is
the most attractive standard of liability for recovery in the event of a
defect. This theory does not demand proof that the software devel-
oper, programmer, or vendor (collectively "the software dealers")
was at fault.' 6 If such a requirement were imposed, it would be
particularly difficult for the average computer user, who may be a
"technical[] illiterate,"'15 7 unable to search machine code to locate a
defect.' 58 Without question, the software dealers are better able to
detect a fault: they are in possession of the source code,'5 9 and they
employ skilled workers who have experience in the field.' 0 With
their technical sophistication, software dealers are better positioned
152. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990).
153. Desilets, supra note 51, at 516-17.
154. See supra notes 89, 132, 138 and accompanying text.
155. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 9; Gemignani, supra note 10; Nycum, supra
note 85; Desilets, supra note 51; Hall, supra note 131; Lanoue, supra note 131; Turley,
supra note 85.
156. See RE:srAIMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1964).
157. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 145.
158. Desilets, supra note 51, at 524.
159. Id.
160. Nycum, supra note 85, at 17.
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to determine whether there are risks in using the software, whether
those risks can be prevented, and what procedures are necessary to
eliminate the problems.
161
Strict liability is only appropriate if the software is considered a
product, thus falling under the "any product" language of section
402(A)(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.162 Arguably, the
tangible disk containing the software is a product, something, analo-
gous to the U.C.C.'s definition of "goods," which is "movable at the
time of ... sale."' 63 Furthermore, software can be considered "as the
completion of an incomplete machine,"'' the component that must
be added to, and work in conjunction with, hardware to provide a
functional computer. "' If the hardware meets the requirements for a
product, so should the "component" software. Indeed, one commen-
tator contends it makes no sense to have a system where the form in
which the software is provided dictates the standard of liability when
that software causes an injury. 66 Should there be any difference in
liability between software supplied as a computer-installed module
(i.e. part of the computer hardware and thus a "product") or
software supplied on a floppy disk (i.e. potentially not a "prod-
uct")?167 Arguably not, because both forms of delivery convey the
same information.
Even if software is not considered a tangible product, the appli-
cation of strict liability still should not be precluded. In Ransome v.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 6 the court held that strict liability
could apply to damage caused by an intangible entity, i.e. electricity.
Electricity was found to be a consumable product,' 69 "a form of en-
ergy that can be made or produced by men, confined, controlled,
transmitted and distributed.' 70 Despite the fact that the transmis-
sion of electricity is a service, the electricity itself was found to be a
product. 71 Certainly software is human-produced, controlled, and
distributed. Although it is not consumed in the conventional sense,'
161. GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, § 29:17, at 421-22.
162. RESIATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402(A) (1964).
163. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1990).
164. GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, § 29:17, at 422.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1979).
169. Id. at 648.
170. Id. at 643.
171. Id. See generally Hall, supra note 131, at 389.
172. "To expend (fuel, for example); use up." THE AMERICAN HERIrAc. DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 286 (William Morris ed., 1980).
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the fact that software can be used repeatedly and has the ability to
benefit society'7 ' further supports the idea that it is a product.
It can be argued by analogy with other products that software
should be subject to strict liability because an error in the program
constitutes a design defect. 74 In the same way an error in a
blueprint for a car constitutes a design defect in the finished vehicle,
a bug in a program results in an error when the program is run. 5
Because the auto manufacturer can be held strictly liable for the
flaw, the software vendor should likewise be held liable for a pro-
gram error.' 7 6
Policy reasons also dictate that strict liability should be applied
to software. A key consideration in the application of strict liability
is the relative position of the victim with respect to the defendant.' 7
Applying strict liability allows the financial burden to be placed on
the manufacturer and/or the vendor, the parties most able to bear
the costs of the loss.'78 The manufacturer is also in a better position
to detect and correct flaws in the program, thus contributing to acci-
dent reduction. 179 Fairness requires that compensation be provided to
the innocent victim who has been financially damaged because of the
injury.' 8 ' This compensation can be supplied by the manufacturer,
who is in the better financial position relative to the victim. Further-
more, the manufacturer can absorb the costs, either through insur-
ance or price adjustments. 8 '
Policy reasons also dictate that retailers of the software be held
to a strict liability standard. Like manufacturers, retailers are in a
more favorable position to bear the costs of an accident than the in-
nocent purchaser. 82 Imposing such a high burden furthers the policy
goal of accident prevention in three ways: First, by encouraging re-
tailers to deal with manufacturers who design and construct safe
products; second, by providing financial security for those injured by
a defective product; and third, by relieving the victim of the heavy
173. Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 145.
174. Nycum, supra note 85, at 17. But see Roy N. Freed, Products Liability in the
Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270, 275-79 (1977). Freed contends that a program is a
process, not a product, and to apply strict liability is thus improper. Id.
175. Nycum, supra note 85, at 17-18.
176. Id.
177. Lanoue, supra note 131, at 448.
178. Id. at 448 n.39. This policy is known as "loss spreading" and is based on the
premise that the manufacturer will distribute the costs through higher prices to customers. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. KEETON iT AL.., supra note 81, § 100, at 706.
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burden of proving where in the manufacturing chain the defect
originated. 8 In addition, holding the retailer to a strict liability
standard provides recourse to the injured consumer in the event the
manufacturer is insolvent. 18 Finally, due to the nature of the contin-
uing relationship between the retailer and the manufacturer, the re-
tailer is more likely to successfully resolve the incident with the man-
ufacturer without litigation than is the victim. 8
Two other policy reasons have been proposed to support the
application of strict liability to software. 8 First, strict liability pro-
vides a means of recovery for a plaintiff injured as the result of
"spontaneous malfunctions" that can occur without evidence of any
negligence.187 If such a malfunction occurs, no recovery is possible
under a negligence theory. 88 Second, it avoids random application of
the law.' 89 If an injured driver could collect under strict liability for
a defective steering mechanism, it is unreasonable to forbid recovery
under the same theory for the same injuries which were caused as a
result of a defectively programmed on-board computer.' 90
Despite the benefits of applying strict liability to software, argu-
ments have been proposed against such application. 9' These include
the position that software is not a product, 92 and therefore does not
fall under section 402(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 9 It
has been suggested that section 402(A) does not apply if the product
is expected "to be processed or substantially changed before it
reaches the user."' 9 4 Software, both conventional and expert systems,
does "change" when it is loaded into a system from a disk or when it
is translated from source code to machine language. 9 However, this
change is certainly expected by the vendor: the software would not
work without it.' 98 Change also occurs with expert systems. These
183. Id. at 707.
184. Id. at 706.
185. Id.
186. Lanoue, supra note 131, at 449.
187. Id. at 449 n.46. How these defects occur is not fully understood. Id.
188. Id. at 449.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See generally GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, §§ 29:1-29:24, at 411-26; Turley,
supra note 111, at 470-75.
192. Nycum, supra note 85, at 16.
193. REs.ATEMENT (SMOND) OF ToRTrs § 402(A) (1964).
194. GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, § 29:3, at 414 (quoting RF.S1AWTMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402(A) (1964)).
195. See id.
196. See id.
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systems are designed to work with user intervention as part of the
expert system's deductive process. 197 The change, therefore, does not
occur before the product reaches the user, but rather in conjunction
with the user. While vendors may not be aware of every possible
change that may be made, 9 ' they knowingly sell the expert system
to accommodate such change.' 99
It has also been proposed that section 402(A) does not apply to
software because it is not unreasonably dangerous.200 Thus, while a
rocket2' or a nuclear power plant20 2 might be unreasonably danger-
ous, the computer program that controls them is not. However, given
that a defect in an expert system that is used in a medical applica-
tion might lead to a death,20 ' it appears such programs could be un-
reasonably dangerous.
2. Apply a Negligence Standard to All Software
The advantage of applying a negligence standard to software,
both conventional and expert systems, is that "[t]here is no dispute
that a vendor of products or services owes a duty of care to the con-
sumer."04 There are, however, two major problems with applying a
negligence standard: First, "[tlhe duty of care the software develop-
ment industry owes to software users is not clear,"20' and second,
tracing the source of a program defect to prove it caused the plain-
tiff's injury is very difficult.206
To solve the first problem and define the duty of care for
software developers, several authorities have argued that a profes-
sional standard should be imposed, thus paving the way for the tort
of computer malpractice.207 A number of difficulties exist with this
approach.20 First, although the nature of writing software programs
is professional, there are neither established professional standards
197. Turley, supra note 11l, at 463.
198. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48.
199. See generally id. at 48-50.
200. GEMIGNANI, supra note 20, § 29:7, at 416.
201. Id.
202. Desilets, supra note 51, at 525.
203. Davis, supra note 9, at Al.
204. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 189.
205. Desilets, supra note 51, at 518-19.
206. Id. at 520.
207. Graziano, supra note 89, at 182-86; Kevin S. MacKinnon, Computer Malpractice:
Are Computer Manufacturers, Service Bureaus, and Programmers Really the Professionals
They Claim to Be?, 23 SANTA CLARA L. RFv. 1065, 1066-74 (1983); Nycum, supra note 85,
at 8-10.
208. Desilets, supra note 51, at 519.
[Vol. 33
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LIABILITY
for practice nor education or licensing requirements.20 9 Second,
many mass-produced computer programs are arguably goods, not
services.210 Third, the tort of computer malpractice has found only
limited acceptance by the courts,2 1' and a number of courts have spe-
cifically dismissed it.2 1 There is no evidence there is a substantial
difference between conventional and expert system software for any
of these problems, although the contributions of many different peo-
ple during the development of expert systems suggests an additional
problem. Different contributors, who have different educational and
professional backgrounds, 2 ' 3 might be subject to different standards.
The second problem with applying a negligence standard to
software is that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that the
defendant breached the duty of care and that the breach caused
plaintiff's injury.11 4 Satisfying this burden is particularly difficult for
expert systems because they are "the embodiment of complex pro-
gramming techniques which require input of expert information into
the knowledge base and the structure of the knowledge base
itself."'1 5
3. Consider the Method of Marketing
a. Mass-Marketed Programs
Mass-marketed programs, either conventional or expert sys-
tems, fall readily into the strict liability category. Mass-marketed
programs are mass-produced and promoted using conventional prod-
uct marketing techniques: Television, trade journal, and newspaper
advertising.2 ' 6 Programs are delivered as a finished product and pur-
chased ready to use, off the shelf, in computer stores, or by mail,
frequently by computer or fax order without any apparent human
intervention.2 ' Prepackaged and sealed disks preclude customer
209. id.
210. Id.
211. Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986).
212. Chatlos Sys. Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), affid after remand, 670 F.2d
1304 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 745 (2d Cir. 1979); Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 612 F.
Supp. 448 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
213. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
214. Desilets, supra note 51, at 518.
215. Turley, supra note 111, at 461.
216. Hall, supra note 131, at 392.
217. Id. at 393.
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"test-drives," requiring the consumer to rely on the manufacturer's
representations as to specifications and performance.21 8 There is no
opportunity to bargain with the software dealer concerning the pro-
gram or its capabilities.2 1 In the same way a car (the quintessential
"product") is purchased without the buyer understanding precisely
how it works, mass-marketed software is purchased without the
buyer comprehending, controlling, or being concerned about its
development.22 °
Although expert systems are fundamentally different from con-
ventional software because they are capable of "interacting" with the
user,22 1 the arguments for using a strict liability standard for all
mass-marketed software, both conventional and expert system
software, prevail. One commentator does not agree, however, and
proposed applying a negligence standard to expert systems.2 22 The
five elements listed in that proposal would make the product/service
and the strict liability/negligence distinctions more difficult:
(1) one-of-a-kind applications; (2) human intervention as part
of the expert system's deductive process; (3) an application area
where no reasonable user would blindly rely on the output of
the expert system; (4) experimental programs where the user is
aware of the infancy of the testing process; and (5) where the
user has contracted [with] a programmer to develop an expert
system and compensation is for the programmer's services
rather than the value of the expert system program. 2 8
None of these points, however, with the possible exception of the
second, applies to mass-marketed expert systems. By definition,
mass-marketed systems are not one-of-a kind applications, but are
designed for wide use. 22 ' The current mass-marketed systems gener-
ally "have a limited range of expert performance ' 225 and are di-
rected to markets where the risks of misuse are presumed to be lim-
ited.2 2 6 Thus, for these systems, even "blind" reliance is unlikely to
create a serious problem. For those mass-marketed systems that have
218. Id. at 393-94.
219. SOMA, supra note 12, § 3.12, at 89.
220. Hall, supra note 131, at 393-94.
221. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48; see supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
222. Turley, supra note 111, at 463.
223. Id.
224. SOMA, supra note 16, § 3.12, at 89.
225. Eliot, supra note 5, at 9.
226. Among those mass-marketed expert systems available as of December 1989 are
TeckChek, which analyzes software programming abilities, RootDirectory, which provides
gardening advice, and Personal Pro, which dissects a golfer's swing. Id. at 10, 13, 14.
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great potential for substantial harm, e.g. expert systems that provide
medical advice, 2 the emphasis in the analysis of strict liability
should be on the "unreasonably dangerous" aspects of the program,
rather than on the "product versus service" distinction. There is no
evidence that experimental programs are mass-marketed, probably
due to the need to monitor the results. Additionally, because of the
methods employed for development and sale, there is never a specific
contract between user and programmer with mass-marketed expert
systems software. 22' Finally, in considering the second element of the
proposal, the limited capacity of expert systems makes its likely user
interaction also limited. Therefore, the human intervention factor of
the second element does not detract from the application of strict lia-
bility for mass-marketed systems.
b. Custom-Designed Programs
Custom-designed or custom-modified software, either conven-
tional or expert systems, does not easily fall into the strict liability
category because, unlike the mass-marketed software, it does not
have the attributes of a product. In general, a contract with a
software designer or vendor to produce a special program is a ser-
vice, analogous to a contract with an engineer or architect to design a
bridge or a building. In both cases, the contractor is relying on the
professional skill of the creator. As stated in La Rossa v. Scientific
Design Co., "Professional services do not ordinarily lend themselves
to the doctrine of tort liability without fault because they lack the
elements which gave rise to the doctrine. There is no mass produc-
tion of goods .... -22 This language emphasizes the importance of
mass production in applying strict liability.
While it is possible to argue that even one-of-a-kind items such
as custom-designed software should be held to a strict liability stan-
dard,2 30 there is little precedent for this application for either con-
ventional or expert system software. Although it may be easy to ar-
gue that a particular program, e.g. one controlling a nuclear power
plant or an air traffic control system, is inherently "unreasonably
dangerous" when used as intended and thus should be subject to
strict liability, a better standard is that each program must be consid-
227. FamilyCare Software provides pediatric advice. Id. at 9.
228. Id. at 9-10.
229. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).
230. Lanoue, supra note 131, at 443-44. In that article the author notes that many
products, such as cars, can be hand-crafted to meet the needs of the individual consumer,
without converting the "product" into a "service". Id. at 444.
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ered on a case by case basis.2"' Such an analysis requires that the
entire scope of the project be reviewed-the reason for the design,
the intent and contribution of the customer, the skill and reliability
of the programmers, the testing of the program, and the contract
provisions-before determining the liability of the various parties.
Both conventional tort and contract remedies should be considered.
In particular, contract remedies may be available to the user of a
custom-designed program that are unavailable to a user of mass-
marketed software. Breach of warranty claims are more likely to ap-
ply to custom-designed software because there is a greater chance
that a specific contract exists between the vendor and the user. In
addition, courts are more likely to regard contracts (and any associ-
ated disclaimers) as binding if they have been negotiated between
parties of relatively equal bargaining power. 232
This analysis applies equally well to a custom-designed expert
system as it does to conventional software. However, the importance
of considering all the factors relevant to liability is amplified in such
an analysis. In a custom-designed system, it is relatively easy to iden-
tify the domain expert, the knowledge engineer, and the program-
mer, and assess their potential liabilities. Furthermore, it is possible
to determine how much the user contributed to the design and devel-
opment of the system. If the user acted as the domain expert and
provided an inaccurate knowledge base, contracted for development
of a system based on a faulty concept that was user-suggested, or
placed undue reliance on the system,2 33 contributory negligence must
be considered.23' Strict liability clearly should not be applied auto-
matically in this kind of situation.
B. Alternative Standards
Because strict liability has not yet been applied to computer
software, additional safeguards may be warranted to protect the pub-
231. In fact, for programs of this type and others, it has been suggested that using a
potentially flawed program may be preferable to the alternatives: Either not proceeding with
the project at all or relying on humans to monitor and make complex computations that are
truly only feasible with a computer. Gemignani, supra note 63, at 322.
232. Turley, supra note 111, at 473.
233. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 46-47.
234. See also Nycum, supra note 85, at 13-14. In this article, it is proposed that con-
tributory negligence should be considered when a customer fails to convey his needs accurately
and completely to a programmer, when a customer fails to notify a programmer of a material
change in conditions that would warrant revision of the program, when erroneous or obsolete
data is used, when too much or too little reliance is placed on the computer, when there is no
back-up system, or when the user ignored an obvious error. Id.
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lic from the harm generated by software-derived computer failures.
Three alternatives, all relevant for expert systems, should be consid-
ered: Regulation of software, regulation of software creators, and
regulation of software users.
1. Regulation of Software
In attempting to screen out unsuitable and unreliable software,
it has been proposed that programs designed for use in professions
such as medicine, law, and accounting should be certified by the ap-
propriate professional organization. 35 Thus an expert system used
by medical professionals would be approved by the American Medi-
cal Association. If the program were "responsible" for recom-
mending drug doses, licensing from the Food and Drug Administra-
tion might also be required. 23 6 Similar licensing by the Federal
Aviation Administration would be appropriate for air traffic control
software.2 37 This certification would provide a national standard for
expert systems that would furnish users with confidence that a mini-
mum level of reliability was present and provide developers and ven-
dors with guidelines for product development. In addition, certifica-
tion could be a positive sales tool for software vendors by providing
an indication of the reliability of the software.
2. Regulation of Software Creators
Traditionally, professionals such as doctors, lawyers, pharma-
cists, and accountants238 have been licensed.239 Such licensing has
been promoted as a method of protecting the health, safety, and well-
being of the public by ensuring that the practitioners in the profes-
sion meet minimum standards of competence. 240 One method for as-
235. Gemignani, supra note 63, 324-25.
236. MYCIN, CADUCEUS, and CASNET are expert systems used by doctors for
diagnosis and treatment of bacterial infections, internal medical problems, and glaucoma, re-
spectively. Turley, supra note 111, at 456 n.9.
237. Hayes, supra note 3, at 115.
238. KEErON ET AL., supra note 81, § 32, at 185-88.
239. Graziano, supra note 89, at 182. See generally James E. O'Connor, Computer
Professionals: The Need for State Licensing, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 256, 256-58 (1978).
240. O'Conner, supra note 239, at 257. O'Connor presents the following arguments in
favor of licensing: (1) it meets the government responsibility for ensuring sufficient education
and training for those dealing with the public; (2) it provides recourse to the public against
fraud and dishonesty; (3) it encourages consistent standards by instituting penalties; and (4) it
provides a central body to keep informed of scientific advances. Id. The arguments against
licensing include: (1) it places a restriction on entrants into the field; (2) it creates a monopoly
that results in increased costs; and (3) it is a government attempt to legislate morality that
disrupts the free enterprise system. Id.
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suring that the developers of expert systems possess minimum profi-
ciency is to require that they be licensed.
At least one author has concluded that computer programmers
are professionals, possessing characteristics common to a profession:
Extensive training, a code of ethics imposing standards higher than
normally required in the industry, disciplinary action for those
breaching the code, emphasis on social responsibility rather than in-
dividual gain, and the need for a license prior to entering the profes-
sion.241 No state, however, currently requires licensing of computer
programmers. 42
For artificial intelligence programs, several members of the de-
velopment team could be licensed. First, the domain expert could be
licensed to the extent possible in the particular area of professional
expertise. Thus, a medical professional who provided the facts and
rules for the knowledge base2 3 could be licensed as a doctor or other
appropriate classification by the state in which the program was
written. As an alternative, national professional organizations such
as the American Medical Association could certify "experts" to pro-
vide information for software development. Second, a knowledge en-
gineer, the person who translates the rules into a computer-compati-
ble procedure,244 could be licensed as a computer professional by the
state, as could computer programmers. Finally, similar licensing
could be appropriate for other members of the development team,
such as program designers and developers.24 5
If no licensing procedure for computer professionals is instituted
by the state, it could be advantageous for software development com-
panies to encourage their employees to voluntarily abide by the codes
of conduct of major professional computing societies."
3. Regulation of Software Users
Some of the same arguments that apply to the regulation of
software creators also apply to the regulation of software users, espe-
cially if the user is in a position to affect the public. While it can be
argued that a user should exercise care in the selection, maintenance,
administration, and reliance on a particular software program and
241. MacKinnon, supra note 207, at 1078-80.
242. Graziano, supra note 89, at 182-84.
243. Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
244. Tuthill, supra note 19, at 48; Reece, supra note 8, at 24.
245. Reece, supra note 8, at 24; Tuthill, supra note 19, at 46-48.
246. See Graziano, supra note 89, at 183 nn. 31-32.
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its results,"7 imposing such a responsibility probably will not pro-
vide adequate safeguards to the manufacturer or the user. As the
user-friendliness of an expert system increasingly reflects "intelli-
gence," it will become more difficult for a court to distinguish be-
tween a program fault and the negligence of the user.24 While re-
sponsibility and care cannot be legislated, a requirement that
software users be licensed could provide protection to the vendor and
the public.
As with programmers, licensing is particularly important for
people who use software affecting public health or safety or directly
influencing the public well-being. 2 9 Expert systems providing medi-
cal information are of particular importance.250 Similar concerns are
directed to expert systems for engineering functions, architectural de-
sign, or financial planning.2"' While it may not be feasible for the
user to fully verify the correctness and reliability of the software,252
it is the user's responsibility to have a basis for deciding if the results
are credible. Users should ensure first, that the software has been
tested by others in the field and that it gives reliable results; second,
that test programs with known solutions have been successfully run;
and third, that the system has been run "in parallel" with conven-
tional methods and has produced the same results.25 Although users,
unlike computer professional s , may not be capable of confirming the
"logical correctness" of the program, they may have a duty to run a
program more than once to ensure that the same results are
achieved.254 If the user were licensed and failed to perform these
preliminary tests, an injured party would have additional re-
course-against the user, the manufacturer, and the licensing board.
A distinction should be made between users who are amateurs
and -those who are professionals. For purposes of regulation, ama-
247. Raymond Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Computer Error and User Liability
Risk, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 124 (1986).
248. Marshal S. Willick, Professional Malpractice and the Unauthorized Practice of
Professions: Some Legal and Ethical Aspects of the Use of Computers as Decision-Aids, 12
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 12 (1986).
249. O'Connor, supra note 237, at 264-65.
250. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
251. See generally Chien & Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 15-18.
252. Gemignani, supra note 63, at 319 & n.9. This author remarks that other profes-
sionals are not required to perform extraordinary tests to ensure their "tools" are suitable for
use. For instance, doctors are not required to do metallurgical testing on scalpels to ensure that
blades are functional. Lawyers are not required to check all citations in a legal treatise to
ensure a correct interpretation is presented. Id.
253. Id. at 320.
254. Id. at 322-23.
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•teurs are those using expert system software for their own use and
without any direct interaction with the public.255 They would not be
regulated due to the difficulty of monitoring all sales and the restric-
tion of any danger resulting from use to the user. Professionals are
those using the expert system in conjunction with their occupation.
This category specifically includes all those with a direct impact on
public health or safety. Professionals would be regulated in order to
maintain professional standards and to protect the public. Such regu-
lations would be enforced either by the vendors, who would limit the
sale of the software to those licensed to practice in the field, or by the
professional organization, which would control the sale of the
software to its members.256 Such regulation alleviates problems asso-
ciated with the idea that one using the software is practicing the
profession without a license.25 Regulation would not, however, ad-
dress the dilemma posed when, in the professional's judgment, the
proper treatment would be different from that recommended by the
expert system.258
IV. PROPOSAL
To determine the appropriate liability standard for artificial in-
telligence software, both the intended function of the program and
the method of selling the software must be considered. If the function
is one that is potentially hazardous (e.g. engineering design, drug
delivery), strict liabilty should be applied. If the intended function is
nonhazardous (e.g. tax preparation, gardening advice), the method of
marketing the software determines the liability standard. Strict lia-
bility should be applied if the software is mass-marketed; negligence
should be applied if the software is a custom program. This proposal
will allow both expert system developers and users to readily deter-
mine the appropriate liability standard, merely by considering two
factors: Function and type of sale. The difficulties inherent in deter-
mining whether the end product of the software is a good or a ser-
255. Amateur users might be home gardeners using RootDirectory, a gardening pro-gram from GardenTech, or golfers using Personal Pro from Computer Sports. Eliot, supra
note 5, at 13-14.
256. Medical expert systems would thus either be sold by vendors only to doctors,
nurses, or other health-care professionals, or by the American Medical Association to licensed
doctors.
257. Willick, supra note 248, at 28.
258. Id. at 30; see also Gemignani, supra note 63, at 325. A closely related problem is
the potential for increased liability if the professional fails to use an expert system that would
have predicted the proper course of action. Willick, supra note 248, at 8.
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vice2 59 would be eliminated because the emphasis would be placed on
whether the software would be used for potentially hazardous
activities.
To provide enhanced safety for the public, licensing require-
ments such as those in place for doctors, lawyers, architects, and en-
gineers should be implemented for those who develop and use expert
systems that are designed for potentially hazardous activities (e.g.
medical diagnosis). The licensing will ensure that those who are in a
position to create a program which could result in harm to the user
will possess the requisite level of skill. This licensing can be admin-
istered either through professional organizations imposing national
requirements, or by state or federal law. Domain experts, who pro-
vide the basis for the rules and facts in the expert system, should be
licensed to practice in their area of expertise, just as doctors and
other professionals traditionally have been. Other members of the
development team-knowledge engineers and programmers-should
also be licensed to ensure minimum standards of professional skill.
In addition, professionals who use expert system software in their
work, e.g. doctors, pharmacists, or engineers, should be certified in
order to use the programs.
To ensure appropriate care in design and preparation of the
software, developers of mass-marketed expert system software-the
domain expert, the knowledge engineer, and the programmer, as
well as the manufacturer and distributor-should all be held to a
strict liability standard. For all practical purposes, such software is a
"product," sold prepackaged to the buyer without any discussion or
bargaining between the buyer and the developer. As such, the
software should be treated as any other product in the event that
harm occurs. Retailers selling mass-marketed expert systems should
also be held to a strict liability standard because they are in a posi-
tion that allows them to bear the costs of an injury more easily than
a purchaser.26 This standard alleviates the difficulty that a relatively
unskilled user would have in proving a defect in a complicated pro-
gram. Furthermore, it eliminates the need for a difficult legal analy-
sis compounded by a complex technical discussion in a trial.2"'
Custom-written and custom-modified expert system software
should be held to a negligence standard, unless an evaluation on a
259. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
260. Individual computer salespeople should not be subject to a strict liability standard.
The burden should be on the plaintiffs to prove that they relied on the representations of the
salesperson. Both negligence and contract remedies should be sought.
261. Turley, supra note 111, at 473.
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case-by-case basis determines that the software is designed for use
with potentially hazardous activities. For non-hazardous activities,
negligence is the appropriate standard. If programs are written on a
contract basis, by programmers employed for their professional
skills, there is a strong indication the developers have been hired for
their services and the program is not a product. Although courts
have hesitated to categorize any software, including expert system
software, as a service, there is some limited precedent. 2
V. CONCLUSION
Computers and the software associated with them empower hu-
mankind to implement acts that are otherwise impossible.2 6 Along
with this power comes a responsibility: to use the maximum amount
of care in the development and application of the programs to mini-
mize potential risks. This obligation is particularly important in the
development, sale, and use of artificial intelligence and expert system
software, two types of computer programs extending their knowledge
beyond that incorporated during the initial creation of the system.
To provide maximum protection to the public, it is necessary to ap-
ply a standard of strict liability to any expert system that is intended
for use in a hazardous activity and/or is mass-marketed. It is only by
treating such an expert system as a product and not as a service that
the public can be assured the chances of creating an unreasonably
dangerous harm can be minimized. Such a severe standard should
not, however, be applied to expert systems that are not directed to
hazardous activities and which are either developed specifically for
one customer or are modified, with the knowledge and/or assistance
of the creator, for a customer.26' Under these circumstances, the pre-
dominant characteristic of the programming is a service. Here, the
computer developer and programmer should be treated as profession-
als and be held to a professional standard. In the event of a problem,
a traditional negligence approach should be used. Contract remedies
should also be available.
Because imposing strict liability is onerous to the developer,
programmer, and vendor of the software, they might work to impose
alternative standards. These include employment of licensed com-
262. E.g., Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986). For further explanation see supra note 89.
263. Gemignani, supra note 63, at 322.
264. Modifications made without the knowledge and assistance of the creator should
also be held to a negligence standard. The burden would be on the plaintiff to prove the
original software developers and manufacturers were responsible for the harm.
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puter professionals, certification by professional societies and trade
organizations, and limitation of sales of "professional" software such
as medical or legal programs to those already in possession of the
requisite licenses and knowledge. Users themselves should be con-
scious of the potential liabilities ensuing from the use of such pro-
grams. To avoid practicing without a license, they should limit their
use to areas in which they are officially sanctioned and/or exper-
ienced, and then should maintain training and updating on a regular
basis.
If it is true that "[tlhe computer is merely an extension of the
human mind, a mere tool to enable us to expand the natural powers
of the brain,"'265 it is in our best interest to continue development of
software and maximize the benefits of technology. The creation and
adoption of standards that address the liability issues serve two func-
tions: First, it eliminates the uncertainties presently existing, and
second, it impresses on software developers the fact they will bear
the consequences of ignoring safety issues. Future artificial intelli-
gence and expert system software will thus be as safe and effective as
possible.
Marguerite E. Gerstner
265. Gemignani, supra note 10, at 199.
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